116 days, 7 Feb/68, Wed.
Slept like a log all night. Even the 155 behind us didn’t wake me – it was
in use nearly all night, firing into the area of our adventure yesterday. We
had this morning off, but the 1/49 and 2/49 ARVNs didn’t. The two ARVN
battalions went out to the area after all the ordinance stopped falling and
walked in un-challenged.
What they found was in a way, expected
The VC had a complete base camp in the several hedgerows in the area.
That’s why the air strikes went so deep into the woods and not where we thought
the only VC were. They was what we
didn’t. The whole area was covered with overhead bunkers and long tunnel
complexes, most nearly all of which were destroyed as were all the homes and
everything else in the surrounding area.
They reported that there was hardly a leaf left on the trees. I should hope
not, after all the stuff that went in there. The 2/49 went in first and found
over 100 AK-47s and AK-50s! All the parts except the tube for 5 82mm mortars –
base plated, aiming devices, and several rounds (over 100). The choppers
reported sighting 5 mortar positions the day before. They definitely had been
hitting us from there.
They also found five M-16s, several RPG2 and 7 rounds plus 3
launchers (why didn’t they use them on the tracks?) Three American field
radios, several thousand rounds of ammo – all types, six .30 caliber machine
guns, assorted field gear – pistol belts, canteens, etc., and most important 85
dead VC. Chopper and jet pilots estimated 700 VC had been in direct contact
with us, and the 3/49. And we had nerve enough to assault 200 VC with our
meager force?! Of course, we had no idea of the VC strength. Our estimate was a
platoon!
Intel reports from a nearby village reported 800 VC moving in the area that
week and that night some village said that 200 came by carrying wounded and
head and equipment. There weren’t enough VC left to carry it all however.
We took some souls that day, but we hurt the VC badly also. CRIP received
joint credit with the 10th and the 49th for the 85 body
count. Lt Col Cassidy almost became a 2nd Lt as a result of Recon
being out there.
Remember how they used to send us out after small intel reports, then began
using us more and more for large mission (like Christmas night)? Col
(full bird) Emerson finally put his boot down to Cassidy – DRIP for small
targets only; they are too small a unit to be used for a reaction force. They
are intended for Recon work only.
When Emerson found out about, first us going to the outpost and La Cua,
then second about us being in such heavy contact and even assaulting the place,
he hit the ceiling. – with Cassidy. He radioed and told him if he didn’t get us
out of there ASAP, he would be the lowest 2nd Lt. in the Army and that if ever, ever, he
sent us out on such a mission again he would pull us out of Bao Trai, leaving
the compound undefended and that if talking to him couldn’t give him any sense,
the he (Emerson) would come to Bao Trai personally and beat it into him.
These are more of less direct quotes from the radio operators in the TOC
(radio room). This must have been the reason Cassidy and Nahn came out to the
area personally. So at least this sort of thing shouldn’t happen again.
Of course, Cassidy had no way of knowing what was out there, but when he
learned we couldn’t handle it, he should have allowed us to call artillery and
then pull out, instead of keeping us out there. Five US battalions couldn’t have gotten
in there without severe losses! Tanks would have been the same. The assaults w pulled
were Lt. Than’s and Lt. Enbody’s idea, which brings me to another point.
Enbody is an incompetent, incapable,
punk kid who has no more idea of what’s going on around him, or why or what to
do about it, than a five-year old. I find it hard to believe that the Army can
provide such “leaders” as he.
He started off the day yesterday by falling into the open hatch on the top
of the track. Next, as we approached La Cua, he ran off with a squad after one
VC, leaving his platoon with no leader.
During the first few minutes of our heavy firefight, he lost his ammo
magazines and map twice. When someone suggested to him that we call support, he
began fumbling with his map and said, I quote, “Where the Hell are we?!?!” As
it turned out, the RTO was the one who called most of ;our support, and all of
our dust-offs. Either because Enbody didn’t know how, he was scared to much, or
didn’t have enough foresight to think of such things.
It was nearly two hours before someone decided to call artillery from
BaoTrai, 1000 meters away, and then it was the RTO who was tired of waiting for
permission from the Lt. I think it was a little of all three, but mostly the
latter case.
He is too naive and weak in using authority to disagree with Trung Wi
Than. Trung Wi
is slightly mad anyway, and now he runs the platoon because of Enbody’s
weakness. A wave of Trung
Wi’s
hand and Enbody and Recon follow. The assault by CRIP alone (and all the others
I think) was Trung
Wi’s
idea, and Enbody was stupid enough to go along.
The advisor (Captain) of the 10th cav told him he was crazy.
Assaults like that are senseless, suicides, something you’d see in a John Wayne
movie – even against 2 snipers as we had
thought there were. Especially after air strikes failed to hurt them.
If he had ordered one more assault, I’m sure there would have been a mutiny lead by the platoon sergeant who
told him that he had 12 years in the Army, which he’d gladly forfeit before he
would lose his life on such a senseless assault again.
I personally am sure I would have refused to go again – six months in fail
and all. I’m not about to die in a suicide attack for some incompetent
lieutenant. Everyone else felt the same way, and still does. As long as I live,
I don’t think I’ll ever really believe this ever happened. Assaulting enemy
positions across 500 meters of open field, positions so strong that even US air
strike couldn’t destroy them! And doing it 4 times straight?! It’s a wonder we
weren’t all killed; what could those idiots be thinking of, or were they
thinking at all?
Call us cowards if you will, but no one was going for a fifth try. This was
just not that important, in my opinion, to die needlessly for the stupidity of
the leaders of your platoon. I hope you understand what I’m saying. Maybe I can
make it cleared when I get back (if Enbody doesn’t get me shot or thrown in
jail first).
115 days, 8 Feb/68, Thurs.
We had to pull guard all night last night. Big intel report that 5 battalions reduced to a total of 1000 men
(normally would be 3000) were on the way from the Saigon area back to Cambodia,
and would be passing by our location. We were on the alert in case they decided
to bother us. They didn’t. maybe the VC raiders are returning north now that
their new offensive has failed (26,600 VC dead last count, since 29 Jan.
Today we were out all day, walking in circles (Enbody’s bungling again).
Trung We had his way all day, and we walked twice as much as planned, or
needed, because “VC must die; VC number 10: I must kill VC”. That damned gook
Lt. is crazy! One’s crazy, the other’s stupid – Lord, help us. I’m not getting
paid to follow a Vietnamese leader and I don’t like it and neither does anybody
else. The 1049s are being filled out by the dozens, and I cry every time I
think of mine being disapproved.
On the way back in this evening, we were shot at with an RPG2, which hit
the berm of the read right beside a jeep. No other fire came at us, but we
drove 90 miles an hour that last 500 meters to the Bao Trai gates, burning up
the country side on both sides of the road, with our stream of fire.
Everyone in the compound heard the noise, and when we drove in, we found
them all in their positions on the berm –they thought the far end of town was
being attacked.
THE END
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